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Abstract I claim that two generalizations about sluicing in the recent literature
are epiphenomenal, emerging from the interaction of independent properties of
sluicing and answerhood. The primary focus is on the generalization in Dayal &
Schwarzschild 2010, dubbed Antecedent-Correlate Harmony (ACH). The empiri-
cal pattern is shown to follow from how the semantics of Wh-phrases and correlates
interact with Barker’s (in press) Answer Ban generalization, where the antecedent
cannot be an answer to the sluiced question. In the latter part of the paper, I shift fo-
cus from ACH to the Answer Ban and show how the Answer Ban fills a previously
unnoticed gap in Romero’s (1998) empirical coverage of Inheritance of Content
effects in sluicing. The Answer Ban is, in turn, shown to follow straightforwardly
from the recent semantic condition on sluicing proposed in AnderBois 2011.
Keywords: Sluicing, Kinds, Answerhood, Taxonomic Hierarchies
1 Introduction and background
Sluicing is ellipsis in a Wh-question, leaving the Wh-phrase overt (Ross 1969). The
Wh-phrase is called the remnant. Remnants typically correspond to an XP in the
antecedent called the correlate. Sluicing is a form of surface anaphora in Hankamer
& Sag’s (1976) sense, thus requiring a linguistic antecedent for licensing. In (1),
the antecedent is the left conjunct ‘Jack talked to someone,’ the remnant is ‘who,’
and the correlate is ‘someone’ (strikethrough represents elided material).
(1) Jack talked to someone, but Fred doesn’t know whoi Jack talked to ti.
I focus here on deriving the generalization in Dayal & Schwarzschild 2010 (hence-
forth D&S) dubbed Antecedent Correlate Harmony (henceforth ACH), below:
(2) ACH: The remnant and correlate agree on the presence/absence of a con-
tentful head noun.
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ACH is motivated in D&S by the data in (3); if the correlate is an indefinite pro-
noun, the remnant must lack an NP complement, whereas an indefinite description
requires a remnant with an NP (remnants and correlates underlined).
(3) a. * Joan ate a donut. Fred doesn’t know what.
b. Joan ate something. Fred doesn’t know what.
c. * Joan ate something. Fred doesn’t know which donut.
d. Joan ate a donut. Fred doesn’t know which donut.
First, I claim that only a subset of ACH data follows from sluicing-specific consider-
ations (the ACH paradigm should not receive a unified account). Second, sluicing-
specific ACH effects follow from the interaction between the semantics of correlate
NPs, remnants, and the constraint in (4), proposed by Barker (in press).
(4) Answer Ban: The antecedent cannot be an answer to the sluiced question.1
In the latter part of the paper, I focus on the Answer Ban itself. First, I highlight how
the Answer Ban fills an explanatory gap in the account of sluicing given in Romero
1998 (often adopted in more recent literature), and then show how the Answer Ban
follows from the semantic condition on sluicing proposed in AnderBois 2011.
2 Narrowing the domain of inquiry
2.1 ACH violations can be split into two classes
D&S takes ACH to be a sluicing-specific generalization, which is supposed to cap-
ture the entire pattern illustrated in (3). In this section, I show that the arguments
in D&S for ACH-as-sluicing-specific only apply to a subset of the data in (3). I
take this as an indication that ACH is not a unified phenomenon; there must be a
sluicing-specific account, capturing that data in (3) for which the arguments in D&S
do go through, and a non-sluicing-specific account, capturing the rest of the data.
Before proceeding, it is useful to make a distinction between ACH violation
types: bare violations are where the remnant is a simple Wh-phrase and the cor-
relate has a contentful NP (e.g. (3a)); contentful violations are those where the
remnant has an NP, but the correlate is an indefinite pronoun (e.g. (3c)). The argu-
ment given in D&S for why ACH is sluicing-specific only considers bare violations.
Their argument is as follows. If ACH were not sluicing-specific, it should ap-
ply to both sluices and their corresponding pre-sluices (the non-elliptical alternant
of the sluiced question). D&S shows that once confounds are controlled for, this
prediction is not borne out, supporting the conclusion that ACH is sluicing-specific.
1 Barker’s formulation is couched in terms of inquisitive semantics (Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009),
I’ve modified it since I will not be using the inquisitive semantics framework here.
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First, note that since the ACH violations in (5) are out, the notion that ACH is
not sluicing-specific is supported, since the judgement for the pre-sluice is the same
as the judgement for the sluice. It follows that whatever account is given for the
judgement in (5b) should extend straightforwardly to the judgement in (5a).
(5) a. * Joan ate a donut, but I don’t know what.
b. * Joan ate a donut, but I don’t know what she ate.
However, as noted in D&S, what appears to be an ACH effect in (5b) follows
from the felicity conditions on denying knowledge of a question (see Romero 1998).
In (5b), the speaker has committed themselves, in uttering the antecedent, to having
an answer to the question ‘what she ate,’ so that they cannot then deny knowledge of
the question. Switching from a 1st to 3rd person subject controls for this, avoiding
the inconsistency in (5b) (see (6b)); however, the sluiced version does not improve
(as shown in (6a)), supporting the notion that ACH is sluicing-specific.
(6) a. * Joan ate a donut, but Fred doesn’t know what.
b. Joan ate a donut, but Fred doesn’t know what she ate.
Importantly, the same argument does not extend to contentful violations. In (7),
switching to a 3rd person subject neither improves the pre-sluice nor the sluice.
(7) a. * Jack ate something. {I don’t/Sally doesn’t} know which donut.
b. * Jack ate something. {I don’t/Sally doesn’t} know which donut he ate.
Contentful violations call for a non-sluicing-specific story, as the pattern observed
in sluicing is detected in its absence; there is sluicing-specific ACH, pertaining
only to bare violations, and non-sluicing-specific ACH, pertaining to contentful
violations. In this paper, I focus only on sluicing-specific violations (and thus, bare
violations), leaving an account of non-sluicing-specific violations to future work.2
2 A plausible lead in accounting for the paradigm in (7) is to consider the semantic and pragmatic
requirements of ‘which,’ which requires a salient set of alternatives in the discourse; the antecedents
in (7) fail to introduce such a set. In support of an account along these lines, consider (i), below; here
the antecedent contains lexical material which implicates the requisite set of entities for licensing
‘which’ (e.g. the verb ‘firing’ suggests a workplace with a set of employees):
(i) Sally fired someone, guess which employee she fired.
Importantly, in (i), both the sluice and the pre-sluice are acceptable, in support of the non-sluicing-
specific nature of ACH effects involving contentful violations.
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2.2 Further sharpening the data
Dayal & Schwarzschild (2010) probe the animate/inanimate distinction in remnants
(i.e. ‘who’ vs. ‘what’), though they do not do so extensively, since their primary in-
terests lie elsewhere. Their empirical claim is that bare ACH violations with ‘what’
are unacceptable (see (8a)), though violations with ‘who’ are, though sometimes
‘exactly’-modification of the remnant is required (compare (8b) and (8c)).
(8) a. * Joan ate a donut. Fred doesn’t know what (exactly).
b. Linguists go to those conferences. Fred doesn’t know who *(exactly).
c. Sally met a phonologist. Fred doesn’t know who (exactly).
In fact, the data with inanimates are more nuanced; first, acceptable violations
are possible with ‘what,’ just as with ‘who,’ and second, just as with ‘who,’ some-
times ‘exactly’-modification of the inanimate remnant is required. The relevant data
can be split into three classes: (a) irredeemable violations, which are unacceptable
regardless of ‘exactly’-modification (e.g. (9)); (b) redeemable violations, which
are unacceptable without ‘exactly’-modification (e.g. (10)); and (c) ACH defiant
violations, which are good regardless of ‘exactly’-modification (e.g. (11)).
(9) a. * Jack had a profiterole, but Fred doesn’t know what exactly.
b. * Jack ordered an éclair, but Fred doesn’t know what exactly.
c. * Jack got a cat, but Fred doesn’t know what exactly.
(10) a. Jack had a Cajun dish, but Sally doesn’t know what *(exactly).
b. Jack ordered a pastry, but Sally doesn’t know what *(exactly).
c. Jack drives a foreign car, but Fred doesn’t know what *(exactly).
(11) a. Jack had a drink, but Sally can’t recall what (exactly).
b. Jack ordered food, but Sally doesn’t know what (exactly).
c. Jack ordered an appetizer, but Sally can’t recall what (exactly).
What differentiates each class seems to be, roughly, the degree of “specificity” of
the NP choice in the correlate. Compare, for example, (9b), (10b), and (11b), which
differ only in the choice of correlate NP; ‘éclair’ is more specific than ‘pastry,’
which, in turn, is more specific than ‘food’; the less specific a correlate’s NP, the
more acceptable an inanimate bare ACH violation becomes.3
3 There is a high degree of interspeaker variation, for a given noun choice in the correlate, whether
an irredeemable, redeemable or defiant ACH violations results. Data collection in this study was
carried out informally, that is by asking native English speaking linguists whether they accepted a
given string. While all speakers accepted ‘food’ as ACH defiant, some found ‘Cajun dish’ “less
redeemable” than ‘foreign car,’ for instance. The data reported here reflects dominant tendencies in
judgement patterns (accounting for the variation is beyond the scope of this paper).
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My basic claim is that unacceptability in bare violations results from a violation
of Barker’s (in press) Answer Ban (see (4)); the antecedents in unacceptable viola-
tions count as answers to the sluiced question. More specific correlates render the
antecedent an answer to the sluiced Q, but not less specific correlates. The relevant
notion of specificity can be captured with reference to taxonomic hierarchies; less
specific nouns are higher on the hierarchy than more specific nouns. A plausible
hierarchy for some of the nouns in (9)-(11) is given below:
(12)
food, (11b)
pastry, (10b)
profiterole, (9a)éclair, (9b). . .
Cajun dish, (10b)
gumboétouffée. . .
. . .
Before proceeding, I provide a test for determining when the Answer Ban is
behind the unacceptability of bare violations. A distinction crucial to the account
defended here lies in how we understand the notion of answerhood as it pertains,
on the one hand, to the Answer Ban, and, on the other, a more general notion.
The felicity conditions on asking, or denying knowledge of Q, are sensitive to
answerhood (call them Q-felicity conditions). To ask, or deny knowledge of Q, one
must not know the answer to Q. This is why (13a) and (13b) are inconsistent.
(13) a. Sally met Jack, but {Sally doesn’t/#I don’t} know who she met.
b. A (to B): Sally met Jack. B: #Who did she meet?
c. * Sally met Jack, but Sally doesn’t know who.
As noted in D&S in defense of the claim that ACH is sluicing-specific, switching
to a 3rd person subject in (13a) fixes the inconsistency. In D&S, such data are taken
as evidence that ACH is not sensitive to answerhood, since, as examples like (13c)
show, unacceptability persists despite a 3rd person subject, which fixes (13a).
Here, I assume it is precisely answerhood at stake (pace Dayal & Schwarzschild
(2010)). Importantly, the Answer Ban only checks whether the antecedent is an
answer to the constituent question CP; the grammatical person of the matrix subject
is irrelevant. Since the antecedent in both (13a) and (13c) counts as an answer
to ‘who she met,’ the Answer Ban blocks sluicing. Second, the Answer Ban is
sluicing-specific, which is why it is not active in the pre-sluice for (13c) in (13a).
This gives us a diagnostic for the Answer Ban; while the Answer Ban makes no
reference to Q-felicity conditions, we can use these conditions to test for answer-
hood. We predict that for any Answer Ban violation, we can reproduce the patterns
in (13); a pre-sluice with a 1st person matrix subject should be out, but not a 3rd
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person subject (as in (13a)), and having “speaker B” ask the sluiced CP in response
to the antecedent, as in (13b), should violate Q-felicity conditions.
This much supports that the Answer Ban is behind the acceptability patterns ob-
served in (9-11); the pattern in (13) can be reproduced, with variations as predicted
for irredeemable (see (14)), redeemable (see (15)), and defiant cases (see (16)):
(14) a. She had a donut, but {Jack doesn’t/#I don’t} know what she had.
b. A: She had a donut. B: #What did she have?
c. * She had a donut, but Jack doesn’t know what.
(15) a. i. She had a Cajun dish, but Jack doesn’t know (exactly) what she had.
ii. . . . but I don’t know #(exactly) what she had.
b. A: She had a Cajun dish. B: What #(exactly) did she have?
c. She had a Cajun dish, but Jack doesn’t know what *(exactly).
(16) a. She had some food, but {Jack doesn’t/I don’t} know what (exactly).
b. A: She had some food. B: What did she have?
c. She had some food, but Jack doesn’t know what.
In short, antecedents in irredeemable cases always count as answers to the sluiced
question, only count as such in redeemable cases in the absence of ‘exactly’-modification
of the remnant, and never count as such in ACH defiant cases.
In the following, I focus on how different NP choices in (9-11) interact with an-
swerhood, the role of ‘exactly’ in redeeming redeemable cases, and why acceptable
bare violations with animates are more freely available than with inanimates. This
will be shown to follow from a difference in the semantics of ‘what’ and ‘who.’
3 A semantics for questions, answers, and bare remnants
I adopt a Hamblin 1973/Karttunen 1977 semantics for questions: Qs denote the
set of possible answers to Q, and Wh-phrases are existential quantifiers. For the
question ‘who left’ in a model with just Jack and Bill, we get a set like that in (17).
(17) Jwho leftK = λp∃x[human(x) ∧ p = ∧left(x)]
= { ∧left(Jack), ∧left(Bill), ∧left(Bill+Jack) }
Additionally, I follow Heim (1987) in assuming that ‘what’ quantifies over kind
level entities. Some evidence for this comes from ‘there’-existential constructions;
kind-denoting NPs behave as weak in post-copular position in existential construc-
tions (adopting Milsark’s (1977) terminology) (see (18a)). As Heim (1987) notes,
a ‘what’-trace also behaves as weak in the same position:
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(18) a. Thee is every *(kind of) linguist in Austin.
b. What is there in Austin?
c. * Who is there in Austin?
Dayal (in prep) also notes that ‘what Nanimate’ prefers a ‘kind of ’ reading:
(19) a. {what/#which} man would do such a thing? (‘what kind of man . . . ’)
b. {which/#what} student is she talking to?
Additionally, bare ‘what’ needs a choice between kinds (see (20)) where a
choice between object-level entities is all that is required for ‘which.’ I indicate
‘what”s sortal restriction to kinds with a superscript k on the variable in (21).
(20) Context: There are three identical mugs before you, each with coffee in
them.
{which/#what} was yours again?
(21) JwhatK = λQ∃xk[Non-human(xk) ∧ Q(xk)]
For kind-level arguments with object-level predicates, I adopt derived kind predi-
cation (DKP), in Chierchia 1998:
(22) DKP: If P applies to objects, and xk denotes a kind:
P(xk) = ∃yo[∪xk(yo) ∧ P(yo)]
A question like ‘what broke?,’ then, gets the meaning in (23):
(23) Jwhat broke?K = λp∃xk[non-human(xk) ∧ p = ∧∃yo[∪xk(yo) ∧ broke(yo)]]
{∧∃yo[∪vasek(yo) ∧ broke(yo)], ∧∃yo[∪wineglassk(yo) ∧ broke(yo)], . . . }
or {∧a vase broke, ∧a wineglass broke, . . . }
For answers, I adopt Dayal’s (1996) answerhood operator, Ans, which selects
the true proposition that entails all other true propositions in the question meaning:
(24) Ans(Q) = ιp[Q(p) ∧ ∨p ∧ ∀p’ ∈ Q [[∨p’ ∧ Q(p’)]→ p ⊆ p’]]
With this machinery, the Answer Ban is violated whenever the antecedent entails
Ans(Q). I proceed to show how these assumptions work with inanimates.
4 The three different kinds of inanimate correlate
4.1 The Basic/Super-Basic level distinction
I focus first on irredeemable cases. Recalling the structure in (12), each ‘level of
specificity’ in (12) maps to a different pattern of acceptability:
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(25)
food
(ACH defiant)
pastry
(Redeemable)
profiterole
(Irredeemable)
éclair
Irredeemable
Cajun dish
(Redeemable)
gumbo
(Irredeemable)
étoufée
(Irredeemable)
The irredeemable level corresponds to what have been called basic level (BL) nouns
in the literature (Brown 1958, Cruse 1977, Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-
Braem 1976, Rosch 1978, Heller & Wolter 2008).
An NP corresponding to any level of specificity may appropriately apply to a
given object, but the choice of level of specificity is not random; a noun correspond-
ing to the BL is privileged. For instance, to take an example from Cruse 1977, if
you own a cat, aside from the cat’s name, the NP [NP cat ] is most suitable in (26):
4
(26) I’m taking the {cat/#mammal/#American longhair} to the vet.
BL nouns like ‘cat’ constitute, in some intuitive sense, a ‘neutral’ level of specificity
(adopting Cruse’s (1977) terminology). BL nouns are more frequently used to refer
to objects than non-BL nouns, and BL nouns have been claimed to be appropriate
for classifying objects in a relevant way in “most contexts.”
I do not concern myself here with why the BL is privileged; following Cruse
(1977), the factors that determine whether a noun corresponds to a basic or non-
basic level of specificity are arguably non-linguistic. Nonetheless, a noun’s BL
status has linguistic consequences. One example of this comes from work on Wh-
ever free relatives (see Dayal 1997, Heller & Wolter 2008); it is only felicitous to
use a Wh-ever free relative if you cannot identify its referent at the basic level.
The underlined clauses in (53) have an argument corresponding to various levels
of specificity; if the correlate nouns in the irredeemable cases are BL Ns, we expect
to see the pattern in (53). Correlate nouns in irredeemable cases will block Wh-ever
free relatives, whereas non-BL nouns introduce sufficient indeterminacy.
(27) a. Jack prepared some food. Whatever it was, he really enjoyed it.
b. Jack ordered a Cajun dish. Whatever it was, he really enjoyed it.
c. * Jack ordered a profiterole. Whatever it was, he really enjoyed it.
4 Worth noting is that any of the descriptions in (26) would satisfy the conditions on licensing the
definite article (i.e. would serve to uniquely identify a familiar referent in the context of utterance),
so that infelicity of non-BL nouns in (26) cannot follow from the failure to license the definite.
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Another difference between BL correlates and less specific correlates (super
basic level or SBL), is that SBL correlates allow for a subkinds reading. This can
be detected in (28-29); access to the sub-kinds reading for SBL ‘Cajun dish’ allows
those sub-kinds to be counted. BL nouns (e.g. ‘donut’) do not seem to have a sub-
kinds reading, as only the object-level instantiations of donuts may be counted:5
(28) Context: There are 9 bowls on the table, three of them have jambalaya in
them, three, gumbo, and three, boudin.
a. Count the number of Cajun dishes on the table.
i. Three. (Three kinds of Cajun dishes)
ii.Nine. (Nine object-level Cajun dishes)
(29) Context: There are 9 donuts on the table, three of them are glazed, three of
them are chocolate, and three of them are jelly-filled.
a. Count the number of donuts on the table.
i. * Three. (Three kinds of donuts)
ii. Nine. (Nine object-level donuts)
Another way of teasing out the sub-kinds reading in SBL nouns is as in (30).
SBL nouns are ambiguous between a kinds reading, a sub-kinds reading, and an
object level reading (e.g. ‘Jack dropped a pastry on the floor’). The object level
reading is implausible for a direct object of a verb like ‘prepare,’ or ‘bake,’ in the
context in (30). Thus, (30) is only ambiguous between (30a) and (30b):
(30) Jack knows how to prepare a Cajun dish.
a. Jack knows, in general, how to prepare Cajun dishes. (Kind reading)
b. He knows how to prepare, for instance, jambalaya. (Sub-kinds)
c. # He knows how to prepare the jambalaya Bill ate on Tuesday. (Object)
We can force a specific, sub-kinds reading in (30) by modifying ‘Cajun dish’
with ‘certain’ (‘a certain Cajun dish’). This makes (30) unambiguous, only having
the reading in (30b). However, disambiguation by ‘certain’ is not possible with
a BL noun, which follows if the BL noun lacks the sub-kinds reading; (31) only
has the reading in (31a), and modification by ‘certain’ only gives the implausible
reading where Jack knows how to bake some actual individual donut.
(31) Jack knows how to bake a (#certain) donut.
5 It is arguably access to the (non-singleton) sub-kinds reading for the SBL nouns in (53) which
introduces the indeterminacy required to license Wh-ever, assuming those sub-kinds include kinds
at a basic level of specificity.
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a. Jack knows, in general, how to bake donuts. (Kind reading)
b. He knows how to bake a glazed donut. (Sub-kinds unavailable)
c. # He knows how to bake the donut on the table. (Object)
4.2 Sluicing with BL/SBL correlates
This difference in the accessibility of a sub-kinds reading between SBL and BL
nouns plays a central role in capturing the distinctions in (9-11). Following Krifka,
Pelletier, Carlson, ter Meulen, Link & Chierchia 1995, and Dayal 2004, Ns are am-
biguous between denoting properties of kinds or object level entities. As mentioned
in §4.1, SBL nouns are three ways ambiguous, and BL Ns only two ways.
SBL nouns have a property of kinds denotation (the singleton set with the kind
as member), a property of sub-kinds denotation (the non-singleton set of the sub-
kinds), and a property of objects denotation (the set of instantiations of the kind,
differentiated here with numerical subscripts). BL nouns like ‘donut,’ on the other
hand, have only the kind and object level denotations.
(32) a. JCajun dishkindK = {Cajun dishk}
b. JCajun dishsub-kindsK = {jambalayak, boudink, étouféek, . . . }
c. JCajun dishobjectsK = {Cajun disho1, Cajun dish
o
2, . . . }
(33) a. JdonutkindK = {donutk}
b. JdonutobjectsK = {donuto1, donut
o
2, . . . }
This difference is insufficient to capture the facts in (9-11); we must also appeal
to domain restriction in questions (specifically, sluiced Qs). As Chung, Ladusaw &
McCloskey (1995) note, remnants in sluices inherit the restriction of the correlate (a
phenomenon dubbed Inheritance of Content). In (34), for instance, the sluiced Q
only has a reading where Fred doesn’t know which sort of Cajun dish Jack ordered.
The pre-sluice in (35), however, is ambiguous between the indicated readings.
(34) Jack ordered a Cajun dish, but Fred doesn’t know what exactly.
a. = Fred doesn’t know what (Cajun dish) Jack ordered.
b. 6= Fred doesn’t know what (food) Jack ordered.
(35) Jack ordered a Cajun dish, but Fred doesn’t know exactly what he ordered.
(No obligatory Inheritance of Content, either (34a) or (34b) are possible)
Following Romero (1998), I model Inheritance of Content as domain restric-
tion on the remnant. For domain restriction, I adopt a property-type variable R
i,〈e,t〉, freely available as an NP modifier, which may receive its value from a salient
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property (Bach & Cooper 1978, von Fintel 1994, Heim & Kratzer 1998). In sluic-
ing, the correlate renders its NP’s property salient, supplying the value for R in the
remnant. Inheritance of Content, with the semantics of correlates and remnants,
will get us violations of the Answer Ban when we need them, and not otherwise.
4.2.1 Sluicing with SBL correlates (redeemable violations)
For inanimate bare violations with ‘what’ as a remnant, there are two property-of-
kinds denotations which may be inherited: the property of kinds and of sub-kinds
denotations.6 The property of kinds violates the Answer Ban:
(36) Jack ordered a Cajun dish, but I don’t know what *(exactly).
Jwhat Jack orderedK =
λp∃xk[non-human(xk)∧Cajun dishkinds(xk)∧p=∧∃yo[∪xk(yo)∧ordered(Jack,yo)]]
= {∧∃yo[∪Cajun dishk(yo) ∧ ordered(Jack,yo)]}
Ans(Q) = ∧∃yo[∪Cajun dishk(yo) ∧ ordered(Jack,yo)]
Since the antecedent entails Ans(Q), the Answer Ban is violated. Inheriting the
property of sub-kinds would work as the antecedent does not entail Ans(Q).
(37) Jwhat Jack orderedK =
λp∃xk[non-human(xk)∧Cajun dishsub-kinds(xk)∧p=∧∃yo[∪xk(yo)∧ordered(Jack,yo)]]
= {∧∃yo[∪gumbok(yo) ∧ ordered(Jack,yo)],
∧∃yo[∪jambalayak(yo) ∧ ordered(Jack,yo)], . . . }
Ans(Q) = ∧∃yo[∪gumbok(yo) ∧ ordered(Jack,yo)]
However, recall that ‘Cajun dish’ corresponds to the redeemable class of ACH vi-
olations, and requires ‘exactly’-modification. I assume this is because ‘exactly’-
modification is needed to access the sub-kinds reading for SBL nouns.
I propose a relevance implicature to capture this; if a more specific level than
SBL were relevant in a given discourse, the speaker would choose a more specific
noun in the correlate. Antecedents are assertions, and (following Roberts (1996)
inter alia), assertions can be seen as answers to implicit questions. In a given dis-
course, different levels of specificity may be more or less relevant:
(38) A: What did Jack order?
B: A Cajun dish (Fine at a food court, # at a Cajun restaurant)
Sluicing contexts differ from those in (38) in having an overt assertion that
precedes the sluiced question; in these cases, a ‘what’ question would count as
answered by the antecedent if the correlate has a BL noun. What I suggest is that
the same is true for SBL correlates: the sorts of contexts in which an antecedent
6 The property of objects denotation would clash with ‘what”s sortal restriction to kinds.
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with an SBL correlate would be relevantly informative are precisely those in which
a subordinate level of specificity is not relevant. This has the effect of rendering the
SBL of specificity salient, favoring the kinds reading over the sub-kinds reading.
(39) Specificity implicature: Given an assertion, A, in a discourse, D, with an
inanimate SBL argument, A relevantly and completely addresses a ‘what’-
question version of A in D.
The implicature effectively blocks access to the sub-kinds reading with SBL
nouns in sluicing contexts, so that, for instance, ‘Jack ordered a Cajun dish’ counts
as an answer to the question ‘what did Jack order?.’ The sluiced question in (40),
then, counts as answered, in violation of the Answer Ban, blocking sluicing.
(40) * Jack ordered a Cajun dish, but Fred doesn’t know what Jack ordered.
As for how ‘exactly’-modification of the remnant saves examples like (40), it is
noted in D&S that ‘exactly’-modified Qs presuppose that a more precise answer is
possible than some already-available answer in the discourse. This is an indication
that ‘exactly’ cancels the implicature in (39), signaling that a more specific level
is relevant. This gives access to the sub-kinds reading for the correlate, allowing
Inheritance of Content to rescue what would otherwise be an Answer Ban violation.
Worth noting, is that there are other ways to render the sub-kinds interpretation
salient and relevant in a given discourse. In the discourse in (41), the Question under
Discussion (QuD), is about sub-kinds of Cajun dish; here, ‘exactly’-modification
becomes optional. This contextual manipulation essentially renders redeemable
violations defiant, in support of the pragmatic account defended here.
(41) A: Jack ordered jambalaya, Sally ordered gumbo, and Bill, étoufée.
B: What about Matt?
A: Well, Matt got a Cajun dish too, but I can’t remember what (exactly).
4.2.2 Sluicing with BL correlates (irredeemable violations)
As shown above, the kind reading for an SBL noun gives a violation of the Answer
Ban; the same is straightforwardly true for BL nouns. Since BL correlates lack a
sub-kinds reading, needed to satisfy the Answer Ban, we predict that BL correlates
yield unacceptable bare violations. Furthermore, ‘exactly’-modification will fail
since BL nouns lack a sub-kinds reading.
While BL nouns lack a sub-kinds reading in the cases we’ve examined so far,
sub-basic level categories are conceptually available; we can easily imagine various
sub-kinds of donut (see (42)). This raises the question of how such levels may be
accessed in a discourse. Given the data we’ve examined so far, the pattern seems to
be that BL nouns themselves consistently fail to make such a reading salient. We
must resort to alternative mechanisms, such as the utterance context.
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(42)
donut (BL)
. . .with sprinkleschocolateglazed
The lack of access to sub-basic levels with BL nouns is something I will not address
to any satisfying notion of depth here, though I do point out that the question’s
presupposition is perhaps too strong. There are ways to manipulate examples that
render sub-basic levels salient, though, there is reason to believe that such access
does not come from the BL noun itself, but from other sources.
Recall that the analysis proposed here is concerned with providing an account
for examples like those in (9-11). Such examples have a specific character: we have
an antecedent followed by a sluiced ‘what’-question; and the correlate in each case
is a simple indefinite description. Sticking to these sorts of cases has been useful,
in that they serve as a control which allows us to isolate the correlate’s NP as the
culprit behind what renders a given bare violation redeemable or irredeemable.
Once we consider different sorts of examples, the picture becomes muddied, as
the redeemable/irredeemable distinction is blurred; under certain conditions, we can
break the correlation between level of specificity and redeemability. Nonetheless, a
case can be made that the account for the pattern in (9-11) proposed here extends
to these other cases (the Answer Ban is behind the acceptability patterns we find).
There are other ways besides ‘exactly’-modification of the remnant to access the
sub-kinds reading for a given correlate. For instance, a sub-kinds reading can be
explicitly constructed, with the ‘kind of N’ construction, which forces a sub-kinds
reading (see Wilkinson 1995, Zamparelli 1998 and references).
(43) a. Context: 3 bowls of gumbo, 3 of jambalaya, 3 of étouffée.
Count the kinds of Cajun dish on the table.
Possible answers: 3, *9. (only subkind)
b. Context: 3 chocolate donuts, 3 glazed, 3 with sprinkles.
Count the kinds of donut on the table.
Possible answers: 3, *9 (only sub-kind)
As expected, sluicing is also possible with ‘kind of N’ correlates (or remnants).
Example (44) shows that when the correlate explicitly has a sub-kinds reading, a
bare ACH violations becomes acceptable, even with a BL head noun (example (44a)
is arguably not an ACH violation, since ‘what’ has an NP complement, ‘kind’).
(44) a. Jack ordered a donut, but Fred doesn’t know what kind (of donut).7
7 I do not have an account for the process by which ‘of donut’ may be missing in examples like
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b. Sally ordered one of the kinds of donuts in the display case, but Fred
couldn’t remember what (exactly).
Aside from the ‘kind of N’ construction, there are other ways to render sub-
basic level kinds salient. Context is important. By far, the majority of sluices in
the literature involve simple examples with no context. Once context is provided,
the empirical picture changes. Consider (45), below. In (45), a set of sub-kinds of
a basic level category is made salient, unlocking access to a sub-kinds reading for
speaker A’s question (the remnant here is paraphrasable as ‘what kind of donut?’).8
(45) A: Jack got a glazed donut, Bill, a plain donut, and Sally, a jelly-filled donut.
B: What about Frank?
A: He got a donut too, but I didn’t see what (exactly).
To summarize, a simple indefinite description with a BL noun, as in the cor-
relates in (9), is insufficient to render a property of sub-kinds salient, though there
are other mechanisms which can achieve this. Worth emphasizing is that ‘exactly’-
modification by itself is not such a mechanism; it works with SBL correlates be-
cause SBL nouns are inherently ambiguous, having a property of sub-kinds as a
possible reading. While the implicature in (39) renders the kinds reading more
salient for SBL nouns, ‘exactly’ can explicitly cancel (39), granting access to the
sub-kinds reading. Since BL nouns lack a sub-kinds reading, ‘exactly’ won’t help.
4.3 Hyper level NPs
ACH defiant correlates containing nouns like ‘food,’ ‘appetizer,’ ‘drink,’ are just
like redeemable correlates in having a sub-kinds reading:
(46) Jack detests several foods. (cf. ‘{several Cajun dishes/#several donuts}’)
Given that ‘exactly’-modification of the remnant is not required to render an ACH
violation acceptable in these cases, I assume that such nouns do not come with the
(44a); there is no such thing as PP ellipsis in English, though perhaps ‘of ’ in (44a) is inserted post-
syntactically, maybe for Case reasons. NP ellipsis may obviate the need for the Case licensing
preposition. Alternatively, a more general process like “predicate ellipsis” may be at work.
8 Sub-kinds readings may also be made salient outside of sluicing contexts. Consider, for instance,
(ii); here ‘the same donut’ is most naturally paraphrased as ‘the same kind of donut’ (thanks to Cleo
Condoravdi (p.c.) for this sort of example):
(ii) Every morning, on the way to work, Jack stops at the donut shop on the corner and always
orders the same donut.
Characterizing all the ways a sub-kinds reading may be accessed with BL nouns is beyond the scope
of this paper, though the reader should keep in mind that in the simple cases, it is not accessible.
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specificity implicature of SBL correlates. Thus, ‘exactly’-modification would be
unnecessary, as the sub-kinds reading is not suppressed.
Inheritance of Content, then, may target the sub-kinds reading, avoiding a vio-
lation of the Answer Ban (the antecedent does not entail Ans(Q)):
(47) Jack had some food for lunch, but I don’t know what.
λp∃xk[non-human(xk)∧foodsub-kinds(xk)∧p=∧∃yo[∪xk(yo)∧had(Jack,yo)]]
={∧∃yo[∪Chinese foodk(yo) ∧ had(Jack,yo)],
∧∃yo[∪Italiank(yo) ∧ had(Jack,yo)], . . . }
5 Animate correlates
Bare violations with ‘who,’ with animate indefinite descriptions as correlates are
ACH defiant, as noted in D&S. The level of specificity of the correlate is irrelevant:
(48) Sally met with a {scientist/geologist/seismologist}, but I don’t know who.
scientist
geologist
. . .volcanologistseismologist
linguist
. . .semanticistphonologist
This pattern follows if the domain of quantification for ‘who,’ unlike ‘what,’ is not
sortally restricted to kinds, but object level entities instead. Since NPs are ambigu-
ous between denoting a property of objects or kinds, the property of objects would
always be available for inheritance. Inheriting the property of objects as the restric-
tion allows the antecedent/sluice pair to respect the Answer Ban (the antecedent in
(49) would not entail Ans(Q), since no specific lawyer is entailed):
(49) Jack met with a lawyer, but I don’t know who.
λp∃xo[human(xo) ∧ lawyerobjects(xo) ∧ p = ∧met-with(Jack,xo)]
={∧met-with(Jack, lawyer Bill),
∧met-with(Jack, lawyer Sally), . . . }
However, the empirical picture is not so clean, once again, if we deviate from
indefinite descriptions as correlates. As noted in D&S, examples like (50) require
‘exactly’-modification of the remnant:
(50) Linguists go to those conferences, but I don’t know who *(exactly).
I lack an account for why ‘exactly’-modification is needed in these cases, but high-
light some empirical observations that could be useful in formulating such an ac-
count. The fact that the antecedent in (50) is a generic sentence with a bare plural
(kind denoting) correlate seems important, as either switching to an episodic (as in
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(51a)), or replacing the bare plural with a non-bare plural (as in (51b)) renders the
example ACH defiant. The relationship between episodicity, bare plural correlates,
and the Answer Ban is left for future work.
(51) a. Linguists were at the conference last week, but I don’t know who.
b. Some linguists go to those conferences, but I don’t know who.
6 The Answer Ban and Inheritance of Content
I now shift the focus from ACH to the Answer Ban. I show how the Answer Ban
fills a gap in Romero’s (1998) account of Inheritance of Content. Romero’s (1998)
claim is that Inheritance of Content is a direct consequence of conditions on focus
and deaccenting in Rooth 1992a, Rooth 1992b; Schwarzschild 1999. For space
reasons, I do not discuss the account in Romero 1998 in its entirety, and instead
focus on a subset of cases where Romero’s account overgenerates.
Inheritance of Content is satisfied when the domain of quantification of the
correlate and the remnant are equivalent, which follows straightforwardly if Inheri-
tance of Content is when the domain of the remnant is restricted by the correlate’s
property. Inheritance of Content is not satisfied whenever the correlate/remnant’s
respective domains of quantification are in a (proper) subset to superset, or disjoint
relation (i.e. when domain restriction of the remnant by the correlate’s descriptive
content does not obtain). The crucial case for our purposes is when the correlate’s
domain of quantification is a proper subset of that of the remnant.
In Romero’s (1998) theory, inheritance of content follows from non-sluicing-
specific conditions on the licensing of prosodic reduction. However, Romero (1998)
notes that while these conditions are met in subset to superset cases, Inheritance of
Content is still detectible. In (52), the sluiced Q is about students, not people:
(52) Jack talked to some students, but I don’t know who.
a. = . . . but I don’t know who (students) he talked to.
b. 6= . . . but I don’t know who (people) he talked to.
In Romero’s (1998) account, the antecedent must entail the presupposition of the
sluiced Q.9 In a subset to superset violation of Inheritance of Content, as in (52b),
the antecedent entails the presupposition of the sluice (‘Jack talked to someone’).
Though the conditions on focus/deaccenting are met, sluicing is still out.
To remedy this, Romero (1998) appeals to Q-felicity conditions; (52b) is incon-
sistent since the speaker is committed to knowing a (partial) answer to the sluiced
9 This is a (perhaps over-) simplification of Rooth’s and Schwarzschild’s respective machineries as
implemented in Romero 1998, but it will do for our purposes. The reader is invited to check that
this move is harmless.
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question by uttering the antecedent and cannot then deny knowledge of Q.10 As
with the argumentation in D&S in favor of treating ACH as ‘sluicing-specific’ (see
§2.1), this hypothesis predicts that switching the subject of the matrix clause from
1st to 3rd person should free us from Inheritance of Content effects, as Q-felicity
conditions would be satisfied. However, Inheritance of Content persists even with
this manipulation, supporting a sluicing-specific account.
(53) Jack talked to some students, but Fred doesn’t know who.
a. = . . . but Fred doesn’t know who (students) he talked to.
b. 6= . . . but Fred doesn’t know who (people) he talked to.
Of course, the Answer Ban is sluicing-specific and explains the pattern in (53):
sluicing is out with interpretation (53b), since the antecedent is a partial answer
to the sluiced Q. A simple definition of partial answers suffices for our purposes;
intuitively, we want propositions that remove from consideration a subset of propo-
sitions in JQK to count as partial answers. The antecedent in (53) meets this criterion
as it removes propositions where Jack did not talk to a student. The antecedent in
(53) counts as a partial answer to the unrestricted (53b), but not (53a). The Answer
Ban acts as a sort of filter on possible interpretations for a sluice, as only the inter-
pretation consistent with domain restriction renders the antecedent a non-answer.
7 Deriving the Answer Ban
The claim in D&S is that ACH follows from a semantic licensing condition on
sluicing. Since I am arguing that (sluicing-specific) ACH follows from the Answer
Ban, it is the Answer Ban that should be derived. I show how the Answer Ban
follows automatically from the inquisitive semantic proposal in AnderBois 2011.
In inquisitive semantics, a sentence, S, may be informative, inquisitive, or both
(called hybrid sentences). Sentences with indefinites and disjunctions (which make
good antecedents) count as hybrid. Inquisitive Ss denote sets of alternatives (called
possibilities) (written [S]), and raise an issue as to which alternative is the case. For
instance, the sentence ‘Jack or Sally left’ raises the issue of whether Jack, Sally, or
both left. The informative contribution of the sentence in a discourse is equivalent
to its classical meaning, and proposes to update the context by excluding worlds
where neither Jack nor Sally left.
Given two sentences, S1 and S2, S1 partially addresses an issue raised by S2 if
S1’s informative contribution removes a proper subset of possibilities in S2 from
10 As a side note, Romero 1998 claims that ‘exactly’-modification of the remnant can circumvent this,
as there is no commitment on the part of the speaker for knowing ‘exactly-Q.’ However, as far
as I can tell, the Inheritance of Content facts persist in (52b), even under ‘exactly’-modification,
providing an empirical puzzle for her account.
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consideration, and completely addresses it if it also picks out a unique possibility in
S2. A hybrid assertion cannot address an issue it, itself, raises. This can be shown
with a hybrid sentence, S, with an indefinite description. The choice of NP in the
indefinite serves an ‘issue-regulating’ role, in that its contribution to the informative
content of S precludes certain possibilities from [S]. Another way of stating this is
that S can, at best, only address broader issues than any that it introduces.
Consider the sentence ‘Jack met a student’; [S] would be a set of alternatives
differing with respect to distinct students Jack might have met, since the informative
content of the sentence removes from consideration possibilities where Jack did not
meet a student. S, here, can only be seen as partially addressing a broader issue; the
issue of who he met more generally, and it says that whoever it was was a student.
In the theory of AnderBois 2011, sluicing may go through only if the antecedent
and sluice raise the same issues (i.e. the sets of possibilities associated with each
are mutually entailing). Since a hybrid assertion (e.g. a sluicing antecedent) cannot
address the issue it raises, if the issue it raises is to be equivalent to that raised by a
subsequent sluice, then it cannot address the issue raised by the sluice either.
8 Conclusion
Conceptually, the approach adopted here is a reductionist one, in that it takes two
generalizations in the literature, ACH and the Answer Ban, and derives them from
independent properties of sluices. As a generalization, ACH itself (even sluicing-
specific ACH) is too strong as it stands, though the counterexamples (acceptable vi-
olations) are shown to follow from how the semantics of questions and antecedents
interact with a more robust sluicing-specific generalization, the Answer Ban.
An empirical contribution of this work is the three way split between BL, SBL,
and HL nouns, which not only finds independent support outside of sluicing, but
gives us a handle on bare ACH violation acceptability patterns. The semantics
of remnants and correlate NPs, specifically, the animate/inanimate distinction, and
whether the correlate’s head noun counts as BL, SBL, or HL, play a central role in
determining whether a sluice violates the Answer Ban. Inheritance of Content, pace
Romero (1998), was shown to count as yet another sluicing-specific generalization,
luckily one which could also be collapsed with the Answer Ban.
The Answer Ban, was, in turn, argued to follow from a sluicing-specific seman-
tic identity condition, something which is uncontroversially independently needed.
As noted in Chung 2013, there is no consensus as to what that condition is, though
there are many proposals on the market. The approach adopted here is that of An-
derBois 2011, in large part because that theory automatically yields the Answer
Ban straightforwardly as a consequence. Whether other theories, such as that of
Merchant 2001, give similar results is left as a project for future work.
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